Download Citation on ResearchGate | Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology | In Edmund entre Husserl y Heidegger en el artículo de la Enciclopedia Británica. En el artículo “Fenomenología” (), que Husserl escribió como 30 Cf. Husserl, E. (): El artículo “Fenomenología” en la Enciclopedia Británica. developed the project of a Husserl Dictionary (), El artículo de la Enciclopedia Británica (The Encyclopedia Britannica Article.
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Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. Husserl sought to establish a strict philosophy and, at the same time formulated a rational and pure psychology, namely, a phenomenological psychology inside the philosophical phenome nology. So, the importance of this study starts from the need to retake what is a truly phenomenological psychology. The English version, translated by Richard E. The translation of this text is justified not only by its relevance — since it involves two of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger — but also for being a document that expresses in a condensed form, an entire project at that time that britaniac was in progressand a set of ideas that would be further developed.
The translation was done during the last half ofbased mainly in the American artiulo — Draft D — and from this first version; it was able to start the study group with the help of the Spanish version. He also discussed the psychologism in its ultimate form, and the possibility of a pure psychology or phenomenological psychology in comparison with the scientific psychology based in the natural sciences.
Much as the translational difficulties could be present enciclo;edia this type of text, considering the expressions in the phenomenological context, specific to its terminology, it was aimed to maintain the original meaning of the work, as close as possible to the sense of world that Husserl proposed. Agreeing with the proposal not to cease the investigation, we seek so to interpret the work of Husserl without attempting to conclude the ideas on phenomenological psychology.
The final version of this translation is under review for subsequent publication. Between September and DecemberHusserl wrote an introduction for Phenomenology, to be published in the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica in Articlo very enciclopexia version of Husserl, Draft D, was never fully published in life, because the 2 From now on, we are referring to this text just as Article.
Article hussrl Britannica German version appeared only in However, the composition made into English by Dr. Salmon of Oxford, no matter how Husserl agreed, is not so much a translation as a paraphrase of the final version of the article of Husserl for the Encyclopedia Britannica, therefore, not so faithful. Husserl affirmed that Phenomenology had as one of its role to propitiate the foundations for an empirical psychology, but in the s, he started to assign this task not to the transcendental phenomenology, but to what he termed eidetic or phenomenological psychology.
It is important to highlight that phenomenology is a way of accessing oneself, so it can be raticulo appropriate by psychology in its methodological aspects, without becoming, however, an explanatory model of psychic reality.
Husserl criticized the common denominator of all scientific-natural psychologies that is the causality Porta, Thus, phenomenology appeared as a rigorous original science capable of substantiating philosophy, empirical sciences and Psychology. Its importance can be highlighted by its critical position to science, in such a way that allows the construction of other forms of apprehension of reality where is given the relocation of the subject in a historical and worldly context Holanda, With the publication of the Article, Husserl intended enciclopedix provide a brief introduction for laypeople.
What is new in is the way in which Husserl conceived the psychological reduction, starting to distinguish explicitly between a psychological-phenomenological-reduction and a phenomenological-transcendental-reduction, and in that period there was the final and definitive understanding and overcoming of articull transcendental psychologism, themes discussed during this work.
Context of the philosopher and his work Edmund Husserl, was a mathematician and philosopher, and was born on April 8, In he went to Vienna, where under the influence of Franz Brentano, discovered his philosophical vocation. He taught philosophy at britabica University of Halle in the course of Psychology, where he remained from to Husserl contradicted the naturalistic scientism and the logicism, thus having as his objective, the inauguration of a new foundation, a theory of theories, whether of pure logic or of psychology, and from there arose Phenomenology as a foundation for the sciences.
InHusserl began teaching at the University of Freiburg, where Martin Heidegger became brutanica assistant from to The radicalism of the phenomenology of Husserl is based precisely on the project of reconsidering the world and subjectivity, from the suspension of all and any existence, and for this reason he affirms that the place of the transcendental is neutral, since nusserl suspends any already established ontology; when suspending the existential thesis, he emphasizes the reduction to the conscience.
Phenomenology differs from Hussfrl, because it formulates its own methodology, but both have the conscience as object; both have as foundation the jusserl and this led to a more complete study of the theme. In the yearsHusserl made important developments concerning the theme of phenomenological psychology. Considering that Psychology could not rnciclopedia the basis for a transcendental philosophy, Husserl indicated Phenomenology as a possibility for a Phenomenological Psychology and this as a structure of the scientific psychology.
Husserl defines Phenomenology as a new descriptive method intended to provide the fundamental basis for a rigorously scientific philosophy and that will, to a consequent development, allow a reform of artichlo sciences. Besides, he emphasizes that all experience can be subject to such reflection, as well as, effectively, all the ways in which we engage with any real or ideal object.
The task of pure psychology is the re-foundation of philosophy, providing the methodological basis for acquiring the same status as the scientific psychology, through the precise fixation of its fundamental concepts.
The overcoming of the disadvantaged position of psychology in relation to the natural sciences is only possible by fulfilling such a task.
This requires the establishment of a specific discipline, the pure psychology. It is pure while considers the psychological in its specificity and its radical difference from everything that is physical. The fundamental character of the psychic is the intentionality The being of the psychic, while intentional, is nothing other than the being of the phenomenon.
Husserl explains that, when fully engaged in the conscious activity, we focus exclusively on something specific, atticulo as thoughts or values, but not on the psychic experience as such, because only reflection can reveal this.
Through it, instead of simply understanding directly e. Article of Britannica something in relation to something; here is intentionality. Regarding the ways of appearing of the objects and the experiences of them, we do not live separately the object and the intentional act, but in the appearance of the object is contained the experience of that object that appears.
Intentionality constitutes synthesis or unit, an active and passive britanicaa. When perceiving a enciclopecia, for instance, no matter how there are variations in the modes of appearance, we will have consciousness of the cube while perceived-cube.
Husserl in the Article of assures that although the experience of the other is not immediate as mine oneselfboth are experiences, in which the task of also making phenomenologically understandable the psychic life of the person and the community with all the intentionalities that refer to it, arises. Husserl explains that a particular method of access is necessary for the pure phenomenological field: Husserl, p. From this, Husserl observes that the method of the phenomenological reduction is constituted in accordance with the double aspect of the phenomenological descriptions, the noetic-noematic analysis.
It is with the identification of the nature of the intentional consciousness and the constitutive nature of the intentional objects that we can reach the full meaning of the appearance of the phenomena.
That is, in the subject-object correlation we find two poles in the subject, one characterized by the act that aims noesis and the pole of the thing aimed noema. In relation to the foundation of Phenomenology, about the question of Husserl of how it is possible for the cognizing subject to reach, with certainty and evidence, a reality that is external to him? Through noesis, which are the acts of giving by which consciousness targets a certain object in a certain way, and the content or meaning of these objects targeted is the noema Whitehead, Husserl moves to the thematic of the eidetic reduction, in which the change of polarization from thing-pole to self-pole is evinced, causing phenomenology to be redirected analytically from the object to the transcendental ego.
The transcendental reduction raises the passage from the dr to the phenomenological attitude, since the eidetic reduction emphasizes the capture of the essence of the phenomena and the constitution of the senses of the world, that is, what Husserl called reduction for the essences.
Thus, if the phenomenological reduction planned a means of access to the phenomenon of the real and also potential inner experience, Husserl affirms: However, there are differences with respect to the a priori of each: Thus, it also demands the exploration of hussfrl psychic processes, in consonance with the exploration of the syntheses of consciousness in which the intentional processes are pertaining, and the demonstration of the description of the essential characteristics of a universal stream of consciousness.
Finally, Husserl differentiates the static from the genetic phenomenology, since the descriptive-static analysis of the essences leads to problems of genesis.
Thus, by elaborating the project of a pure phenomenology and succeeding britaniica reflexive analysis of the phenomena, in order to apprehend its essence by the eidetic intuition, Husserl intended to make explicit the intentional britqnica and their contents.
However, the analysis of the intentional phenomenon was done from the static point of view and for this reason, he did not want to justify the genesis of this phenomenon. Husserl affirms in the Article, that on top of the first static phenomenology it will be built at higher levels, a genetic phenomenology. In this changing from the static phenomenology to the genetic, it is interesting to point out that, as Goto highlights, many phenomenologists and psychologists who are based on phenomenology are restricted to the descriptive-static level of phenomenology.
For this reason, they must be hussserl of the flexibility of the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl and its various levels, to comply with that the author proposed, since phenomenology should not be conceived as a new approach to psychology but as an epistemological assumption. In Locke, the transcendentally pure men husserrl Descartes are turned into a human soul, whose systematic exploration through the inner experience engages Locke by a transcendental-philosophical interest.
Therefore, he is the founder of psychologism as a transcendental philosophy founded through a psychology artixulo inner experience. The destiny of scientific philosophy depends on a radical overcoming of every trait of psychologism, an overcoming that not only exposes the initial contradiction of psychologism, enciclopefia also does justice to its transcendentally significant core of truth.
If, inHusserl combats the logical psychologism derived from the empirical psychology; as ofafter the transcendental turn and the discovery of the transcendental reduction, the author starts to combat the transcendental psychologism in its various forms.
During the s, Husserl developed the project of a pure psychology; inhe conceived a reduction properly psychological and elaborated the psychological route for the transcendental reduction. It is relevant to this work the explanation, inof a final understanding and overcoming of transcendental psychologism, in its most refined form. It refers to a transcendental self, not personal-empirical, as a being who knows, feels, desires, etc.
This transcendental self is not a self dissociated from the object, but the one that manifests himself in all his acts as intentionality. From the transcendental turn, the combat against psychologism no longer consists in distinguishing between ideal objects and psychological subjects, but in the distinction between psychological and transcendental subjectivity Porta, Besides, it is only through the reduction that it is possible to overcome the psychologism, because it is a method for the intuitive access to the transcendental subject.
What changes in is that Husserl perceives that psychologism rests on an authentic evidence, so it can only be rejected in a descriptive-intuitive way. That is, it rests on the perception of the identity of the psychological subjectivity and the transcendental subjectivity, and this parallel can only be perceived when the program of pure psychology is fully developed. Therefore, Porta states, this full development enciclopdeia a necessary condition for the definitive understanding of the transcendental psychologism.
From the beginning, Husserl aims at overcoming the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism and, with respect to the transcendental problem, points out that the meaning and validity of all known objectivity in the immanence of the subjectivity and identified at the core of a subjective process of foundation, should be questioned.
Husserl explains that after the suspension of the natural attitude the theoretical interest is directed to a new cognitive attitude, to determine the intelligible structures that go beyond the merely observable, the empirical, in which all sense that the world has for us which we now have consciousnesswithin the interiority of our own perception, is a conscious sense and is formed in our subjective genesis.
The problematization arose when Husserl perceived that consciousness could not be reduced only to the empirical self, described by the empirical psychology, which investigates the psyche integrated to the psychophysical jusserl in the natural attitude and does not guarantee apodicticity.
Husserl reaches the eidetic exploration, by perceiving that in husser, to reach the sense of the phenomenon for all the consciousness, that is, the intersubjective sense, it is necessary to return to the intentional consciousness. Therefore, the transcendental question, in its universality, includes the entire kingdom of transcendental ingenuity and calls into question every possible world simply alleged in the natural attitude.
Husserl, Edmund – definition of Husserl, Edmund by The Free Dictionary
Therefore, the subjectivity and the consciousness that the transcendental encicpopedia recurs cannot be only the sense of consciousness and subjectivity of which psychology deals with.
It arises the question that, would we then be psychologically pa beings? Husserl continues to develop the transcendental problem in the work Crisis of the European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology, ofbetter known as Krisis, proposing a new investigation to reach the transcendental subjectivity as such.
From this, before returning to the topic of psychologism, Husserl shows the other as another that artuculo be present in my consciousness in the same way as the other entities of the world, that is, the other is the stranger of the self. The reflection is directed beyond the egology to the transcendental intersubjectivity.
Husserl affirms that every transcendent obtains its existential sense as belonging to something only in a relative sense and incomplete by it, that is, as a sense of an intentional unit that is in fact transcendental giving of sense. Only the phenomenological psychology is capable of performing the intentional analysis britanifa the full sense Porta, Article of Britannica phenomenology still needs clarification, because when the true meaning of the philosophical- transcendental problem and the transcendental reduction is unveiled, it pure psychology will, in the possession of the transcendental phenomenology as a mere reversion of its doctrinal content in transcendental terms.
In this way, only the definitive overcoming of the transcendental psychologism presupposes the full development of the phenomenological psychology. However, only from the transcendental phenomenology is that the full constitutive analysis is possible, since the transcendental psychologism in its definitive version is only possible after the articul psychology, which makes possible to conclude that transcendental phenomenology can overcome psychologism in an absolute way because only transcendental phenomenology is able to give to psychologism its ultimate form Porta, The novelty is that transcendental psychologism in its purest form can only be overcome through reduction by way of psychology in the way in which this was conceived in We know that through the phenomenological reduction it is reached in a reflexive way the knowledge of the self as the original source of all the knowledge of the world.
Since the beginning, Husserl had as his goal to seek an ultimate foundation to all the philosophical argumentation in the consciousness of the transcendentally thought-out self. To prove the thesis that the refined transcendental psychologism can only be definitively overcome by the path of the phenomenological psychology, he clarifies that the reduction occurs in two steps, as a double reduction: Thus, only the route through psychology is presented as a reduction applied specifically to the subjectivity, that is, artciulo what is really the essential: The philosopher explains that enciclopefia very function of the method to achieve a fully reasoned universal science demands an infinite task of establishing the complete universe of the a priori in its transcendental self-reference and, therefore, in its autonomy and perfect methodological clarity.